We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) 
Introduction
The theoretical literature on endogenous timing tries to identify factors that might lead to the endogenous emergence of sequential or simultaneous play in oligopolistic markets. 1 In Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) 's action commitment game, two firms must decide a quantity to be produced in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity in the first period, it will have to make its decision without knowing whether the other firm has chosen to commit early or not. If a firm commits to a quantity in the second period, then it observes the first period production of the rival (or its decision to wait).
Hamilton and Slutsky show that this game has three subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibria: both firms committing in the first period to the simultaneous-move Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, and each waiting and the other playing its Stackelberg leader quantity in the first period. They also show that only the Stackelberg equilibria survive elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 2 Observed behavior in experiments on this canonical model of endogenous timing is at odds with the theory. For example, Huck et al. (2002) test experimentally the predictions of the action commitment game. They find that: (i) market outcomes are very heterogeneous,
(ii) Stackelberg equilibria are rare, (iii) Cournot outcomes are modal, (iv) simultaneousmove Cournot outcomes are often played in the second period (delay), and (v) there is a high percentage of outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader.
The questions that the endogenous timing literature tries to address are particularly relevant in terms of new markets, where two or more firms will enter. The experimental evidence suggests that simultaneous-move play may be a better predictor of behavior in 1 The seminal papers are Saloner (1987) , Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , and Robson (1990) 2 Consider the game: 0 48, 32 72, 36 C 32, 48 64, 64 64, 64 W 36, 72 64, 64 64, 64 In this game L represents the strategy of playing the Stackelberg leader's quantity in the first period, C the strategy of playing the Cournot quantity in the first period, and W the strategy of waiting (and playing in the second period). This game has three pure strategy Nash equilibria (C, C), (L, W ) and (W, L). The "Cournot equilibrium" (C, C) does not survive elimination of weakly dominated strategies because strategy C is weakly dominated by W . markets for new goods than sequential play. 3 It also suggests that there may be substantial heterogeneity in behavior in these markets.
Why do we observe this gap between the theoretical predictions and the experimental evidence? One explanation might be that subjects have trouble coordinating their play in one of the two Stackelberg equilibria: if both equilibria are exactly the same then it is far from clear which of the two firms is going to assume the leading role in the first period-see Matsumura (2001) on the instability of leader-follower relationships.
It is possible to think of explanations for some aspects of the experimental evidence.
However, it is much harder to explain most of them. For example, Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) risk-payoff equilibrium selection argument can explain why Cournot outcomes are more frequently played than Stackelberg outcomes since the Cournot-Nash equilibrium risk dominates (i.e. is less risky than) the Stackelberg equilibrium. 4 However, risk-payoff considerations cannot explain delay, collusive or double Stackelberg leadership outcomes.
Another explanation might be inequity aversion. Santos-Pinto (2008) generalizes Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) action commitment game by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. He shows that relatively high levels of inequity aversion rule out asymmetric equilibria, and inequity aversion gives rise to a continuum of simultaneousmove equilibria which include the Cournot-Nash outcome, collusive outcomes as well as double Stackelberg leadership. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay. Although inequity aversion can cast some light into the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games, we believe that the discussion can be further enriched with a different focus.
Recent experiments suggest that in strategic settings without clear precedents, individuals' initial responses often deviate systematically from equilibrium. Moreover, different players seem to employ different levels of reasoning in games. Nagel (1995) was one of the first to provide evidence for this using the p-beauty contest, a dominance solvable game.
She found that most people do not follow the Nash equilibrium prediction of behavior; 3 As we have seen the prediction of Stackelberg equilibria rests on equilibrium selection arguments. Simultaneous-move Cournot-Nash equilibria typically exist, however, they do not survive the application of equilibrium refinements. 4 Here "risk dominates" should be interpreted as strategic uncertainty and not as the decision theoretical notion of risk. In the game in footnote 2 the "Cournot equilibrium" (C, C) risk dominates the "Stackelberg equilibrium" (L, W ) since the product of the deviation losses is highest for (L, W ) (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, Lemma 5.4.4 rather, their degree of strategic thinking is limited to a finite number of iterations when eliminating weakly dominated strategies. Other important references on non-equilibrium models of behavior in games are Stahl and Wilson (1995) , Costa-Gomes et al. (2003) , and Camerer et al. (2004) . In these models, a level-k player computes his best response assuming that his rivals employ less thinking steps; the sole exception is that of the level zero players, who do not behave strategically and choose randomly across the strategy set. 5 This paper applies Camerer et al.'s (2004) cognitive hierarchy model to Huck et al.'s (2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) action commitment game. Since this is a dynamic game and the cognitive hierarchy model is usually applied to static games we assume that: (1) a level zero player randomizes independently at each information set, and (2) players of higher levels choose best responses at information sets using backward induction and use Bayes' rule to update beliefs about their rivals' level of strategic sophistication.
We show that, for empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the cognitive hierarchy model predicts that standard Stackelberg equilibria will not be played. We also show that the model predicts that Cournot outcomes will be frequently played, specially simultaneous play of Cournot quantities in the second period (delay). Finally, we show that the model predicts a high percentage of outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. A level 1 (L1 from now on) prefers to wait since by doing that it can best respond to a level 0 (L0 from now on) who commits to period 1. If the L1 does not observe commitment by the rival in period 1, then he chooses a Cournot quantity since this is his best response to the L0's expected quantity. Thus, when two L1s meet there will be delay. A level 2 (L2 from now on) faces a trade-off between committing to period 1 and waiting. If she knew the rival was an L1, then she would prefer to commit to period 1 with a Stackelberg leader's quantity. If she knew that the rival was an L0, then she would prefer to wait so that she could best respond to the rival when he commits to period 1. For empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, an L2 commits to period 1-because there is a high probability the rival is an L1-and chooses a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader-because the rival might turn out to be an L0.
Next, we take the model to the data and see if it is able to explain the experimental evidence on the action commitment game in Huck et al. (2002) (HMN from now on) .
Since the cognitive hierarchy model typically delivers small sets of predicted behavior we introduce noise into players' behavior by assuming quantal responses (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Rogers et al., 2009; and Östling et al., 2011) . We estimate the model using maximum likelihood and compare its predictions to the data.
We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses is able to explain several of the most important features of the experimental data in HMN. The model predicts spikes in the Cournot quantity in periods 1 and 2. The model also predicts a high percentage of first movers who commit to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. The model's estimates for the percentage of players who commit to periods 1 and 2 are very close to the data. The model predicts little play of strictly dominated quantities which is also consistent with the data. The model generates heterogeneity in market outcomes (e.g., sequential play of Cournot quantities, first movers punished by second movers, double Stackelberg leadership, and collusive outcomes, among others) and predicts a high percentage of Cournot outcomes including simultaneous-move Cournot outcomes in period 2 (delay). Notwithstanding, the model's predictions for the percentages of first movers who play a particular quantity within the set of quantities that are higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader fall somewhat far from those in the data.
In order to gauge the success of the cognitive hierarchy model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. This alternative model posits that players adopt the symmetric mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the action commitment game in HMN with probability θ 1 , commit to the Cournot quantity in the first period with probability θ 2 , and randomize uniformly over all actions with probability θ 3 = 1 − θ 1 − θ 2 .
We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical evidence in HMN. Section 3 applies the cognitive hierarchy model to the action commitment game in HMN. Section 4 explains how we introduce quantal responses in the cognitive hierarchy model, reports the maximum likelihood estimates and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. The appendix contains the payoff matrix of the action commitment game and the classification of market outcomes.
Experimental Evidence
HMN use a laboratory experiment to test the action commitment model in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . Subjects in the experiment were students of various backgrounds who were paid according to their results in the game and a participation fee to cover eventual negative profits. Subjects were told that they would act as a firm which, together with another firm, serves one market, and that in each round both were to choose the period of production and the quantity. Subjects were informed that in each round pairs of participants would 
Total quantities
Consumers' surplus
Total welfare Subjects were handed a payoff matrix with discrete quantity values and the respective payoffs their choices would yield considering the quantities that their randomly matched rival might play and the rival's profit. The experiment was done with two payoff matrices, one large and one small. The large payoff matrix had quantities ranging from the integers 3 to 15 and the small payoff matrix had only 6, 8 and 12 as possible choices. The play lasted 30 rounds and the subjects were informed, at the end of each round, of the quantity and time of entry their rival had chosen and the respective payoffs.
As HMN we focus on the results of the game with the large payoff matrix (see Appendix A). In that game the quantities 6, 7, 8, and 9 are weakly dominated by the strategy "enter the market in the second period." The quantities 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, and 15 are strictly dominated. This game has three Stackelberg equilibria in undominated strategies: two asymmetric Stackelberg equilibria in pure strategies, where one player commits to quantity 12 in period 1 and the other player waits and chooses quantity 6, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium in which players commit to quantity 10 in period 1 with probability 2/5 and with probability 3/5 they wait. Furthermore, there is one pure strategy equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies, namely the Cournot equilibrium in which both players commit to quantity 8 in period 1, and there is also a variety of mixed strategy equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. 7 As Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) require equilibria not to be in weakly dominated strategies, we focus on symmetric mixed equilibrium in which players commit to quantity 10 in period 1 with probability 2/5 and with probability 3/5 they wait. Table 2 displays the percentage of choices made broken down by quantity and period of play for the first five rounds and for the entire set. There are three points worth stressing from inspection of Table 2 . The first is the existence of three spikes in the strategy space indicating a nonrandom structure in the reasoning of players. In period 1 there is a spike in quantity 8 and another one in quantity 10. In period 2 there is a spike in quantity 8.
The second is that more players commit to period 1 than to period 2. The third is that the quantities chosen are highly concentrated in the subset {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} , that is, very few players choose strictly dominated quantities. 8
7 In Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , the linearity of the demand and cost functions combined with the continuous action space guarantee that there are no equilibria where players mix a first period choice with the strategy "wait." With a discrete strategy space there exist various mixed strategy equilibria.
8 Behavior becomes more cooperative as the number of rounds of play increases. By spliting the sample Cournot quantities, and 10, 11 and 12 as Stackelberg leader's quantities.
We will briefly go through the meaning of some of the market outcomes in Table 3 .
The outcome "Cournot sequential" means that the first and second movers both choose a Cournot quantity (8 or 9). The outcome "Stackelberg leader punished" means that the first mover chooses a Stackelberg leader's quantity (12, 11 or 10) and the second mover chooses a quantity greater than his best response to the first mover. The outcome "Stackelberg and Cournot in 1st period" means that one player chooses a Stackelberg leader's quantity while the other chooses a Cournot quantity. The outcome "double Stackelberg leadership" means that both players play a Stackelberg leader's quantity in period 1. The outcome "collusion successful" means that both players play a collusive quantity in either period.
The outcome "collusion failed" means that both players move in period 1, one player into two parts, the first encompassing the first fifteen rounds and the second the remaining rounds, we observe that: quantities 6 and 7 were chosen less often in the first part of the sample than in the second part; quantities 9 and 11 were chosen more often in the first part and less often in the second. Throughout, quantities 8, 10 and 12 remain approximatelly constant in both subsets as well as the stricktly dominated quantities.
chooses a collusive quantity and the other player plays either Stackelberg or Cournot. The outcome "collusion exploited" means that the first mover chooses a collusive quantity and the second a quantity greater than 7. Finally, the market outcome "others" refers to those situations that do not fit into any of the previous cases. 9 4.0 0.9
Leader 11 or 10, follower 7
9.4 6.5
First mover punished or rewarded: Stackelberg leader punished 6.7 11.9
Stackelberg leader rewarded 9 See Appendix B for a complete description of the quantities and periods of play that characterize each market outcome.
1 0 Thus, players of level k ≥ 1 are assumed to not realize that some players might be thinking at least as 'hard' as they are about the game. This could be due to overconfidence: players believe that their rivals have less insight regarding the game they are playing. It could also be due to the limited capacity that Formally, players of level k ≥ 1 know the true proportions of lower-level players f(0), f(1),. . . , f(k − 1). Since these proportions do not add to one, they normalize them by dividing by their sum. That is, players with k ≥ 1 levels of reasoning have the following beliefs about players with h levels of reasoning: Camerer et al. (2004) discuss the properties that the appropriate distribution of levels should possess: it should be discrete because the thinking steps are integers; it should reflect the fact that, as thinking steps increase, so do the computations that the players carry out. Working memory constraints should make it likely that, the higher is k, the fewer are the players doing one further reasoning level. In other words f(k)/f (k − 1) is decreasing in k. Moreover, the authors assume that the ratio is proportional to 1/k and that the distribution is the Poisson f(k|τ ) = τ k e −τ /k!, with k = 0, 1, 2, ... and τ > 0. The advantage of this assumption is that it is reasonable and uses only one degree of freedom.
To apply the cognitive hierarchy model to the action commitment game in HMN we follow the spirit of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) by assuming that 0-step thinkers randomize independently at each information set and higher-level types choose best responses at information sets using backward induction.
In the action commitment game in HMN a player chooses an action from the set {3, 4, ..., 15} ∪ {W }, where W represents the action to delay. Therefore, we assume that in period 1 the L0 randomizes with a discrete uniform distribution with support on {3, 4, ..., 15} ∪ {W }. If that is the case, then the L0 plays each quantity in period 1 as well as W with probability 1/14, i.e.,
for all q ∈ {3, ..., 15}. If the L0 chooses W in period 1, then the L0 will play each quantity people have to continuously eliminate dominated strategies. However, players of level k ≥ 1 are assumed to make an accurate guess about the relative proportions of players using fewer steps than they do.
in period 2 with probability 1/13, i.e.,
Additionally, the best response function of a level-k player, with k ≥ 1, to quantity q Lr chosen by his rival is given by
The next step is to determine the optimal strategy of an L1. An L1 thinks that the population is composed only of L0s. The L1 also knows that an L0 will play a random quantity and will do it in period 1 with probability 13/14 and in period 2 with probability 1/14. We solve backwards. If the L1 commits to period 2 two things can happen: the rival commits to period 1 or the rival commits to period 2. Hence, the perceived expected profit of a L1 who commits to period 2 is
where Pr L1 (W L0 ) is the probability the L1 assigns to the L0 committing to period 2,
is the perceived expected profit of the L1 when the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to period 1, and E(π L1 2 |W L0 ) is the perceived expected profit of the L1 when the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2. Since
we have
If the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to period 1, then the L1 will be able to best respond to the quantity commitment of the rival and so
If the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2, then the L1's perceived expected profit of committing to q L1 in period 2 is
The optimal choice of the L1 is the best reply to the expected output of the L0 since the payoff function is linear in the opponent's strategy (demand is linear). Hence, the L1 chooses BR L1 (q L0 ) whereq L0 denotes the expected output of an L0 and
Substituting (2) and (4) into (1) we obtain
If, on the contrary, the L1 commits to quantity q L1 in period 1, then the L1 will attain a perceived expected profit of
Since the L0 plays randomly, the optimal quantity commitment for the L1 in period 1 is BR L1 q L0 . Therefore, the perceived expected profit of an L1 who commits to BR L1 q L0 in period 1 is
By definition of the best response function, we know that
From (5), (7), and (8) 
Hence, the L1 is better off by committing to period 2, i.e.,
The intuition behind this result is that since L0 players do not act strategically, the L1 has nothing to gain if it commits to period 1 because he cannot condition the L0's response. Therefore, waiting is the optimal choice of an L1.
Let's us now determine the optimal strategy of the L2. The L2 thinks that the population is composed exclusively of L0s and L1s. The L2 knows that an L0 will play a random quantity and will do it in period 1 with probability 13/14 and in period 2 with probability 1/14. The L2 also knows that the L1 will commit to period 2 with probability Pr L1 1 (W ). 11 We solve backwards. If the L2 commits to period 2 two things can happen: the rival commits to period 1 or the rival commits to period 2. Hence, the perceived expected profit of a L2 who commits to period 2 is
where Pr L2 (W Lr ) is the probability the L2 assigns to a rival committing to period 2, E(π L2 2 |W Lr ) is the perceived expected profit of the L2 when the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to period 1, and E(π L2 2 |W Lr ) is the perceived expected profit of the L2 when the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2. We have
If the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to period 1, then the L2's will be able to best respond to the quantity commitment of the rival and the L2's perceived expected 1 1 The L2 also knows that Pr L1 1 (W ) = 1. In Section 4 we will generalize the model by allowing for the possibility that players make mistakes in the timing and quantity choices and so Pr L1 1 (W ) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, to make the analysis that follows compatible with that of Section 4, we will not substitute Pr profit will be
where Pr L2 (L0|W L0 ) is the (posterior) belief of the L2 that the rival is an L0 given that the rival commits to period 1. Assuming the L2 uses Bayes' rule to update beliefs about a rival's type we have
If the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2, then the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to quantity q L2 in period 2 is
where Pr L2 (L0|W Lr ) is the (posterior) belief of the L2 that the rival is an L0 given that the rival committed to period 2. From Bayes' rule we have
The optimal quantity choice of the L2 when the L2 and the rival both commit to period 2, denote it by q L2 2 , is the solution to
We can thus write the L2's perceived expected profit when the L2 commits to q L2 2 in period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2 as
Therefore, the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to period 2 is
If, on the contrary, the L2 commits to q L2 in period 1, then the L2's perceived expected profit is
The L2's optimal commitment quantity in period 1, denote it by q L2 1 , is the solution to
Hence, the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to
The L2 will commit to q L2
. This inequality will be satisfied for sufficiently high values of τ , i.e., when, from the standpoint of an L2, there are many L1s and few L0s in the population. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
The L2 is faced with a trade-off. If she knew the rival was an L1, then she would prefer to commit to period 1 and reap the benefits of a Stackelberg leadership position. If she knew her rival was an L0, then she would prefer to commit to period 2 since by doing that she is able to best respond to an L0 who commits to period 1. However, the L2 only knows the percentage of L0s and L1s and so her optimal choice will depend on τ . When τ is high an L2 prefers to commit to period 1 since she thinks that there are many L1s and few L0s in the population.
We will now show that the L2 commits to period 1 for sufficiently high values of τ .
Setting Pr L1 1 (W ) = 1 in (3), the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to period 2 is simplified to
The uniform distribution assumption impliesq L0 = 9 and the payoff matrix in HMN implies that 8 is the unique best response toq L0 = 9. Hence, BR L1 q L0 = 8. When the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to period 1, the L2 is able to best respond and the L2's perceived expected profit is 59.615. When the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2 the optimal choice of the L2 is q L2 2 = 8 for all τ ≥ 0. This leads a perceived expected profit of 56 when the rival is an L0 and of 64 when the rival is an L1. Therefore, the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to period 2 is E(π 
Setting Pr L1 1 (W ) = 1 in (3), the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to q L2 in period 1 is simplified to
Maximizing the right-hand side of this equality with respect to q L2 ∈ {3, ..., 15} we obtain the optimal quantity of an L2 who commits to period 1:
Therefore, the L2's perceived expected profit of committing to q L2 1 (τ ) in period 1 is
From (21) and (19) we find that τ ≥ 1.58 .58, 7 ] the L2 commits to quantity 10 in period 1. In contrast, if τ ∈ [0, 1.58) the L2 commits to period 2 and (i) if the rival commits to period 1 the L2 best responds, (ii) if the rival commits to period 2 the L2 commits to 8.
So, for empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, i.e., τ ∈ [1.58, 7], the cognitive hierarchy model predicts that L2 players will commit to 10 in period 1. Finally,
we also see that the cognitive hierarchy model predicts delay and a spike in the Cournot quantity 8 in period 2 mostly due to the behavior of L1s. However, the model is not able to predict the spike in the Cournot quantity 8 in period 1.
In short, applying the cognitive hierarchy model to the discrete action commitment game in HMN gives rise to the following behavior predictions:
In period 1 the L0 chooses an action randomly from the set {3, 4, ..., 15} ∪ {W } using the discrete uniform distribution. As a consequence, the L0 commits to period 1 with probability 13/14 and to period 2 with probability 1/14. In period 2 the L0 chooses a quantity randomly from the set {3, 4, ..., 15} using the discrete uniform distribution.
L1: Commits to period 2 and (i) if the rival commits to period 1 the L1 chooses a best response, (ii) if the rival commits to period 2 the L1 chooses quantity 8 (a best response to 9, the average quantity produced by an L0).
L2: If τ ∈ [0, 1.58), then the L2 commits to period 2 and (i) if the rival commits to period 1 the L2 chooses a best response, (ii) if the rival commits to period 2 the L2 commits to 58, 7] , then the L2 commits to 10 in period 1. If τ > 7 then the L2 commits to 12 in period 1.
Further thinking steps are easily added to the model by following the same logic as above.
Estimation
This section explains how we introduce quantal responses in the cognitive hierarchy model, reports the maximum likelihood estimates and discusses the results.
Cognitive Hierarchy with Quantal Responses
Cognitive hierarchy models typically produce a rather small set of best responses. In the action commitment game, predicted behavior alternates (for players other then the L0) between committing to period 1 with quantity 10 or waiting and, either best responding to observed quantities in the case of sequential movement, or playing quantity 8 if no commitment has been observed.
To fit the data well, it is necessary to assume that players respond stochastically rather than always choose best responses (see El-Gamal and Grether 1995 , Costa-Gomes et al. 2001 , Rogers et al. 2009 , and Östling et al. 2011 . One way to smooth out the predicted choices over a wider range is to assume quantal responses-see Palfrey (1995 and 1998) . Hence, we assume that the payoff of an action chosen by a player with level k ≥ 1 is subject to random error and that actions that yield higher payoffs have higher probability of being played. Furthermore, we assume logit quantal responses. With this framework, the error can take place both in the quantity and the timing decisions.
The behavior of the L0 has already been described in Section 3. The L1 thinks that the whole population is composed of L0s and knows the behavior of the L0. When the L1 decides whether to commit to period 1 or 2 he anticipates his subsequent choice in period 2 and incorporates the fact that he can make a mistake in period 2. 12 If the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to quantity q Lr in period 1, then the probability that the L1 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 2 is
e λπ L1 (q L1 ,q Lr ) .
If the L1 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2, then the probability that the L1 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 2 is
where
] is given by (3). Therefore, if the L1 commits to period 2, then the L1's perceived expected profit is
2 ) = 13 14 1 13
where Pr L1 2 (q L1 |W Lr , q L0 ) is given by (22) and Pr L1 2 (q L1 |W Lr ) by (23). If the L1 commits to quantity q L1 in period 1, then the L1's perceived expected profit is E[π L1 1 (q L1 )] defined in (6). Hence, the probability that the L1 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 1 is
and the probability that the L1 commits to period 2 is
where E(π L1 2 ) is given by (24) and E[π L1 1 (q L1 )] by (6). The quantal response probabilities (22), (23), (25), and (26) characterize the behavior of a "perturbed" L1. Note that the parameter λ ≥ 0 is inversely related to the level of error. When λ = 0 all actions consist of error and the L1 becomes an L0. When λ = ∞ there is no error and the behavior of the L1 is "unperturbed."
Let's now turn to the behavior of the L2. The L2 thinks that the population is only composed of L0s and L1s and knows their behavior including the fact that the L1 makes mistakes. Hence, the L2 knows that the L1 might commit to period 1 with positive probability, even though the L1's best "unperturbed" response is to commit to period 2.
When the L2 decides whether to commit to period 1 or 2 he anticipates his subsequent choice in period 2 and incorporates the fact that he can make a mistake in period 2.
If the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival commits to quantity q Lr in period 1, then the probability that the L2 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 2 is
If the L2 commits to period 2 and the rival also commits to period 2, then the probability that the L2 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 2 is
where 
Pr

L2
2 (q L2 |W Lr , q Lr ) by (27), and Pr L2 2 (q L2 |W Lr ) by (28). If the L2 commits to quantity q L2 in period 1, then the L2's perceived expected profit is
where Pr L1 2 (q L1 |W L2 , q L2 ) is given by (22), Pr L1 1 (q L1 ) by (25), and Pr L1 1 (W ) by (26).
Hence, the probability that the L2 commits to quantity q ∈ {3, ..., 15} in period 1 is
and the probability that the L2 commits to period 2 is
where E(π L2 2 ) is given by (29) and E[π L2 1 (q L2 )] by (30). The quantal response probabilities (27), (28), (31), and (32) characterize the behavior of a "perturbed" L2. We see that, by comparison to the situation where there are no errors in players' choices, the L2 has less room to condition the L1's play since now there is a positive probability that the L1 will commit to period 1. Hence, the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses will make different predictions than cognitive hierarchy model in Section 3.
The process is similar for all higher levels of reasoning and so we stop here.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The estimation goes through all the pairs of decisions. By pair, we mean every possible combination of period and quantity decisions of two players playing against each other.
This approach captures the interaction of players taking decisions that are conditioned by their rivals' decisions. The information is thus broken down into three possible cases: both players commit to period 1; both players commit to period 2; and one player commits to period 1 and the other to period 2. 13 The probability that players 1 and 2, paired up against each other, with reasoning levels k 1 and k 2 , play a given pair of timing and quantity choices (t 1 , q 1 , t 2 , q 2 ) is:
The likelihood function then goes through all possible pairs of choices
where t i and q i are the timing and quantity predictions for player i in a given pair, t is the index of timing predictions and q for quantity predictions, n (t 1 ,q 1 ,t 2 ,q 2 ) is the number of cases that each pair is observed in the data, and τ is the parameter of the Poisson distribution. Since cognitive hierarchy models are better suited to explain initial responses (see Crawford et al. 2012 ) our benchmark estimation is done for the first five rounds of play. However, we also estimate the model for the entire set (30 rounds of play). The estimation method is maximum likelihood and it is done according to a standard grid search approach. 14 In order to gauge the success of CH model in fitting the data, we compare it to an alternative model, which we call the noisy Nash model (NN). This alternative model posits that players adopt the symmetric mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium with probability θ 1 , commit to the Cournot quantity 8 in the first period with probability θ 2 , and randomize uniformly over all actions with probability 1 − θ 1 − θ 2 .
Results
We now present and discuss the results of the maximum likelihood estimations. Table 4 displays the estimates of τ and λ for the CH model, the estimates of θ 1 and θ 2 for the NN model, and the respective likelihood values. The estimates are reported for the first five rounds of play and for the entire set.
The estimate of the average number of thinking steps in the CH model is 1.29 for the first five rounds of play and 1.69 for the entire set. The estimate of τ for the first five rounds of play implies that 27.5% of players are L0, 35.5% are L1, 22.9% are L2, 9.8% are 1 4 The routine starts with initial values λ = 0 and τ = 0 and generates the predictions of the model, i.e., the probability of timing and quantity decision for each type of player for all levels k ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}. After, the estimated probabilities of timing and quantity decision of levels k ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10} are aggregated with the probabilities of timing and quantity decisions of the L0 to obtain the estimated probabilities of each pair of timing and quantity choices. The estimated probabilities of each pair of timing and quantity choices are evaluated in the likelihood function. The procedure is repeated several times in a grid search for both parameters λ and τ . Finally, the values of λ and τ that yield the highest value of the likelihood function are extracted. Parallel routines in both GAUSS and MATLAB were used for checking the validity of estimates. The estimates for θ 1 and θ 2 in the NN model are 0.30 and 0.08, respectively, for the first five rounds of play and 0.28 and 0.12 for the entire set. In the first five rounds of play, the estimates imply that 30% of players choose the symmetric mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, 8% commit to the first period to the Cournot quantity 8, and 62% display random behavior. Comparing the likelihood values we see that the NN model generates a poorer fit of the data in the first five rounds of play and in the entire set.
We now turn towards the quality of the adjustment. Table 5 value attainable for the estimation. The lower bound is the maximum likelihood value of the CH and the NN models when there is only random play (it is obtained by setting λ = 0 in the CH model or by setting θ 1 = θ 2 = 0 in the NN model). As is evident from the log-likelihood p-values, we can reject the hypothesis that all players randomize uniformly over all actions. Table 6 displays the percentage of choices, broken down by quantity and period of play, in the data and predicted by the CH and NN models. We will focus our analysis of the results on the first five periods of play since the results for the entire set are very similar. The first thing we can see from Table 6 is that the CH model predicts spikes in quantities 8 and 9 in period 1 together with smaller spikes in the adjacent quantities 7 and 10. The CH model also predicts a spike in quantity 8 in period 2 together with smaller spikes in the adjacent quantities 7 and 9. The CH model estimates for commitment to periods 1 and 2 (56.5% and 43.5%, respectively) are very close to the data (56% and 44%, respectively). The CH model overestimates play of strictly dominated quantities by only 8.5%. Nevertheless, the CH model underestimates the percentage of first movers who play quantities 12, 10 and 11, and overestimates the percentage of first movers who play quantity 9.
The NN model predicts spikes in the quantities 8 and 10 in period 1 as well as a spike in quantity 8 in period 2. However, the NN model overestimates period 1 commitment by 21.2% and overestimates play of strictly dominated quantities by 23%. Finally, we see that the NN fits the spike in quantity 10 in period 1 better than the CH model but the CH model fits the spike in quantity 8 in period 2 better than the NN model. Table 7 displays, for the first five rounds of play and for τ equal to 1.29, the probability that a player of level k chooses an action from {3, ..., 15} ∪ {W } in period 2 and the probability he chooses an action from {3, ..., 15} in period 2. The table also displays, in the second row, the shares of level k players for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}.
As we have seen in Section 3, an estimate for τ of 1.29 for the first five rounds of play implies that an "unperturbed" L1 as well as an "unperturbed" L2 commit to period 2. Table 7 show us that when τ is 1.29 a "perturbed" L1 commits to period 1 with probability 31.5%, a "perturbed" L2 commits to period 1 with probability 47.6%, and both choose quantity 8 with the highest probability. The high percentage of L0s and the fact that when a "perturbed" L1 commits to period 1 he plays quantity 8 with a high probability imply that when a "perturbed " L2 commits to period 1 he typically chooses a quantity less than 10. This is the reason why the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses predicts spikes in quantities 8 and 9 in the first period and underestimates the first period spike in quantity 10. Table 8 compares the market outcomes predicted by the CH and NN models to those observed in the data for first five rounds of play and the entire set.
We see from Table 8 both the CH and the NN models are able to generate heterogeneity 
Conclusion
This paper is an additional contribution to the literature on endogenous timing games.
This literature shows that observed behavior in experiments on endogenous timing is at odds with the theory. The theory predicts Stackelberg outcomes but the experiments find that these are rare and, instead, Cournot outcomes are modal.
We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) to Huck et al.'s (2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) action commitment game. We show that, for empirically reasonable average level of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover produces more than Cournot but less than Stackelberg leader.
We also show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain several of the most important features of the experimental evidence on the action commitment game in Huck et al. (2002) . The model predicts spikes in the Cournot quantity in periods 1 and 2. The model's estimates for commitment to periods 1 and 2 are very similar to the data. In addition, the model generates heterogeneity in market outcomes, a high percentage of Cournot outcomes including simultaneous play of Cournot quantities in period 2 (delay), and a high percentage of outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. Finally, we find that the model predicts collusive outcomes better in the entire set than in the first five rounds of play. It is out of the scope of this paper to study how a learning model can account for the dynamics in the data.
Stackelberg outcomes: 
